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DE RUEHRH #1436 2661417  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 221417Z SEP 08  
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9202  
INFO RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9756

S E C R E T RIYADH 001436

NOFORN  
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA, INR,  
DS/IP/SPC/MSG  
RIYADH PASS TO DHAHRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2018  
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [AMGT](#) [CASC](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [SA](#)  
SUBJECT: RIYADH EAC - 20 SEPTEMBER 2008

REF: A. IICT-2008-83A  
[1](#)B. TDX 315/069244-08  
[1](#)C. RIYADH 01423  
[1](#)D. SANAA 10547

Classified By: DCM DAVID RUNDELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (C), AND (D).

[1](#)1. (S/NF) On September 20, the DCM convened a meeting of Riyadh's EAC to discuss the Mission's security posture in response to additional threat information received describing further attacks planned against U.S. interests in the region following the September 17 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a. Also present in the meeting were MGT, CONS, LEGAT, POL, ECON, DATT, PAO, GRPO, MED, ISC, AGR, DAO, POL-MIL, MSG, DHS, IMO, ATO, CIP, GSO, CG Jeddah, CG Dhahran and RSO.

[1](#)2. (S/NF) RSO opened the meeting by reading to the committee the "Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory" (ref A). This advisory, that expires in 45 days (November 2, 2008), warns of continued and credible terrorist threats against U.S. personnel, facilities and interests over the next several weeks. As described, Al-Qaida leaders have publicly indicated a desire to restart operations in the region, and a body of intelligence reporting on outstanding plots indicates Al-Qaida is planning attacks in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and possibly Kuwait, with additional attack planning in Yemen in the near term also likely. GRPO also presented, Ref B, a newly received, specific threat to large gatherings of Americans in the Kingdom. A sanitized version of this threat was provided for publication in a Wardens Notice.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) In response to the described continued threat stream identifying Americans and American interests as potential targets in Saudi Arabia, the EAC unanimously agreed to continue travel and other restrictions implemented by the EAC on September 17 (ref C). These measures will be reviewed by the committee on Wednesday, September 24.

[1](#)4. (S/NF) To further bolster our existing physical security posture, the RSO informed the committee of the installation of portable Delta vehicle barrier to better control the access road leading to the Embassy rear entrance. Also supplementing existing security personnel around the perimeter of the Embassy and Consulate facilities, additional Saudi security personnel and equipment already requested were reportedly in place or soon to be in place. In fact, in Riyadh, shortly after the EAC meeting concluded, a Saudi staffed machine-gun equipped security vehicle arrived to supplement units already in place outside the Embassy perimeter. Additional armed vehicles and/or soldiers were also said to be forthcoming this date to patrol the Ambassador's and DCM's residences and around the Embassy in Riyadh and at Consulates in Jeddah and Dhahran.

[1](#)5. (S/NF) Later this date, a Post-wide Duck and Cover drill

was conducted. After seeking cover in reaction to the Duck and Cover alarm, all Embassy staff practiced moving to Embassy safe havens, when instructed to do so by Marine Post One. Staff participation, by all accounts, was complete and enthusiastic.

¶6. (S) RSO continues to re-establish/re-staff Embassy emergency teams, including First Responder Medical, Internal Defense, and Emergency Excavation teams, with assistance and participation offered by DATT, MED and others.

¶7. (SBU) RSO Riyadh will continue to maintain frequent communication with RSOs Jeddah and Dhahran to coordinate Mission responses to this continued threat.

¶8. (U) POC for this reporting in Riyadh is RSO John C. Taylor.

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